An ethics concerned with health care developments and systems must be historically continuous, especially as it concerns the application to managed structures of key moral-epistemic concepts such as care, love and empathy. These concepts are traditionally most at home in the personal, individual domain.
Any ethics which concerns itself with medical practice and structures must be continuous with its own past: its concerns must be an extension ofeven, perhaps, a postscript to -that past. This I take to be a philosophical truth. After all, for a very long time now people have been born, led lives, fallen sick, suffered, grown old and died. And for a good stretch of that time they have thought and written about these matters in a variety of moral tones we have no difficulty responding to and may sometimes make our own. The problem is to get clear about the extension and coherence of the postscript we have to write.
There is a specific continuity to which I want to draw particular attention. Moral-epistemic notions like love and compassion, care and concern, sympathy and empathy have a long history. They are not the inventions (or discoveries) of inflexions; but even so they remain embedded in a realm of morals, and ultimately of ethics, which tends towards the personal as opposed to the impersonal, the individual as opposed to the collective, the partial as opposed to the impartial, and the unmanaged as opposed to the managed. That there is such a realm, that it is supremely important to very many people, and that it generates a characteristic moral phenomenology and, even more, a vision of what really matters in life and death -all this is undeniable. What is far less certain is how much space can be made for it within structures whose very logic seems calculated to bypass such concerns and transactions. One such structure is any impersonally and centrally managed arrangement for maximising health care benefits in the face of scarcity.
Nothing I have to say is meant to suggest that we are not immeasurably better off with arrangements of this sort than we would be without them. Nor do I want to argue that we should seek ways in which to make room for the domain I have identified. Indeed, a central theme will be that no such argument can intelligibly be made. For I shall suggest that many of the objections people make against systematized health care and resource allocation can be understood only as demands for the impossible: for the partial and particular and personal to co-exist with and soften the impartial and the impersonal. And it is this that is in the end inconceivable. It is abundantly clear that Thomas, and many very like him, are valued. What is valued, when he is valued, is his just being human. After all, there is little, if anything else, about him to dilute that valuation. I want now to make some points, partly in order to forestall objections. The first is that his still being a human being is not offered as a justification for the valuing of Thomas. It is its object. As such, it is not idiosyncratic, or arbitrary, or mere prejudice. In particular, it cannot be replaced with whatever object-description takes one's fancy, like the more determinate "being a baby", "being a woman", "being a psychogeriatric" and so on. For one thing, descriptions of this sort introduce a level of specific featural concern which overlays the significance of just being human.6
II
Secondly, just being human cannot be adduced as a justification for "giving the preference" to Thomas over other kinds of creatures. This would indeed be speciesist. Were it a matter of justifying "a preference" for Thomas over some horse or dog which had lots more going for it Thomas's humanity would be of no help. For Now, abstraction from distinctness, to which an unrestrained QALY programme is committed, is incompatible with the idea that someone has worth just because he or she is some one. For it seeks to attach that worth to some sort of supra-individual entity, obliterating the boundaries between them. This is why the idea can make a difference, as a constraining device. By affirming, in literal ways, the separateness of human beings it can serve to keep the agglomerative enterprise in check. But I make no detailed proposals here.
IV
I have argued that the value of just being human can, and should, set limits within health care systems to abstraction from separateness. I earlier suggested that there might also be another kind of value, dependent upon particularities of identity, which could not likewise be accommodated within such structures. If there is such a value it must be internal to particular and personal arrangements and unable to exist outside them. Many people believe that there is such a value, and hope vainly to find it retained intact in health care systems.
In an episode of Cardiac Arrest (a TV soap about life in a teaching hospital) the 
